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Water Management in Israel: Rules vs. Discretion
* 
 
Or Goldfarb and Yoav Kislev
** 
 
In this paper we are trying to address two issues. The first is management of the water 
economy under uncertainty and the second issue is the mode of management: we suggest 
management by rule. 
Water reservoirs are common pools; they must be managed collectively. In Israel, 
by law, all water sources are publicly owned and their utilization is under the control of 
the State, managed by the Water Commissioner.
1 The Commissioner is given a set of 
powerful instruments to enforce the law and the chosen management policies. The law, 
however, does not specify the desired policy or the duties of the Commissioner.  The 
implication of this omission is that the lawmakers trusted the Commissioner to manage 
by discretion, to use professional judgment in formulating policies and directing the 
sector. Experience has taught, however, that management by discretion has failed. 
Throughout the years, the Commissioner allowed overdrafting, the water sector was 
brought at least twice in recent years to a severe crisis, and the reservoirs have been 
depleted and polluted. Moreover, facing strong resistance of the farm lobby, the 
Commissioner has been only partly successful in implementing austerity measures in 
emergency drought periods. We present here a model of management under uncertainty 
and in the last section of the paper discuss the possibility of this model to be the basis for 
management by rule. 
                                                 
* Prepared for the conference Irrigation Water Policies: Micro and Macro Considerations, Agadir, Morocco, 
June 2002.  
** Respectively, of the Water Commission and the Hebrew University. We are grateful to Devoira 
Auerbach for editorial assitance. 
1 For a survey of the major issues in the water economy in Israel, see Kislev (2001).   2
Three Nested Circles 
The analysis in the paper is based on programming performed in three nested stages. The 
inner circle in Figure 1 stands for the dynamic programming in a Markovian model 
serving as a formal representation of management under uncertainty. It will be explained 
below. The second circle represents the analysis of the optimal size of agriculture and 
flexible desalination—to be activated only in periods of shortage. The external circle in 
the diagram represents the excess demand of water over and above natural sources. This 




Agriculture and  
Flexible Desalination  
Excess Demand  
Figure 1: The Three Programming Circles  
 
  Agriculture plays two different roles in the water economy. Agriculture is a 
consumer of water and the larger the farming sector, the more water it uses. With limited 
natural resources, the size of agriculture will determine the time and the scale of 
desalination, excess demand in Figure 1. The second role that agriculture may perform is 
as a reserve for emergencies. Water allocation to agriculture can be cut in dry years to   3
avoid difficulties in urban supply. In other words, agriculture may serve as a buffer. The 
two roles are connected: agriculture can serve as a buffer only if its water use in regular 
years is large enough to be a basis for cuts. 
The source of uncertainty in the water economy lies in the underlying nature of 
the sector. Precipitation, in varying amounts, comes in the winter, while most of the 
utilization is in the summer. The appropriate time to inform the farmers about cuts in 
supply—if needed—is in the fall, when spring planting can still be adjusted. But the 
decision in the fall is done under uncertainty, before the winter rains. The solution in the 
Markovian model is simple: decide on allocation for the summer according to the 
condition of the reservoirs in the fall. Allocation is large, when the reservoirs are 
relatively full; supply to agriculture is cut when the reservoirs are empty. The 
contribution of programming is in formulating an explicit policy—management rules that 
are expressed as quantitative relations between water in the reservoirs and allocation to 
agriculture. 
  Flexible desalination may modify the policy. Desalination plants, in times of 
emergency and shortage, will reduce or even eliminate the need to cut agricultural 
allocation. In this way, the planning of supply under uncertainty, here in the Markovian 
model, is connected to average supply and to the decision on desalination plants and their 
destiny—for continuous or flexible operation.  
    4
Framework and Assumptions 
The programming horizon in the analysis is 20 years.
2 For simplicity and clarity of 
exposition, programming was constrained at this stage to a relatively narrow framework 
and to a small number of alternatives. The dynamic programming of management under 
uncertainty covers the water economy of the National Project, which supplies 
approximately two thirds of the water in the country. We view all reservoirs as if they 
were a single cell and disregard differences in enrichment or extraction in the separate 
reservoirs. The state of the reservoir is defined for the month of September every year, 
and the reservoir may be, by assumption, in one of the following states: High +200; that 
is, the amount of water in the reservoir exceeds by 200 MCM (million cubic meters) the 
amount associated with the “red line”—the guideline for marking the lowest water 
elevation in the reservoir. Intermediate 0; the red line. Low –200; water in the reservoir is 
200 MCM less than the red line and over-utilization has occurred. 
  Replenishment is the amount of water added yearly to the reservoirs. We adopted 
the following values and their probabilities: dry year 1,050 MCM (with probability 0.10); 
average year 1,550 MCM (0.80); rainy year 2,000 MCM (0.10). 
  The size of agriculture is defined here (disregarding livestock production) by the 
amount of water allocated from the National Project. Basic agriculture is the amount of 
water allocated to agriculture in regular years. In emergency and shortage, allocation may 
be curtailed temporarily.  The reference for the analysis is the situation in 1998 when 
basic agriculture, as defined here, was allotted 700 MCM/Y (MCM per year). 
  The size of basic agriculture, plus the allocation to agriculture outside the 
                                                 
2  Extending the horizon of the program to more than 20 years did not change the plan for the first several 
years. It can be safely assumed that with changing future conditions, programming will be repeated. Hence 
a 20-year horizon is sufficient for our problem.    5
National Project and the growing urban supply, will determine the total quantity 
demanded of fresh water and hence excess demand—and desalination. For example, 
basic agriculture of 700 MCM/Y requires immediate construction of desalination plants 
of 300 MCM/Y; however, if basic agriculture is of 300 MCM/Y, the first desalination 
plant will be constructed in 2006 and with a smaller capacity of only 50 MCM/Y. 
  By the model, the Water Commissioner has at his disposal a set of possible 
actions. The decision on a policy is a choice of actions to be associated with the states of 
the reservoirs. These associations are then the chosen policy rules. In connection with 
management under uncertainty of supply from natural sources—in the two internal 
circles of Figure 1—the alternative actions are: 
  a. Construction of desalination plants to reduce variability of supply. We shall 
analyze two alternatives, continuous and flexible operation. 
  b. Temporary curtailment of supply to agriculture in dry spells. 
  c. Over-utilization of the reservoirs, below the red lines, up to 400 MCM. 
  d. Shortage in urban supply. This alternative is taken as a choice of the last resort. 
Shortage occurs only if the reservoirs were over-utilized by 400 MCM and there was not 
enough water to provide for urban demand. 
 
The Objective Function and the Cost of Policy 
The objective of the program is to minimize cost. The chosen policy is the set of 
management rules that achieves this goal. The cost is measured as expected capitalized 
value for 20 years.  
  The concept of cost in the analysis is differential. We measure changes in cost   6
caused by changes in the program of the water economy. The reference for comparison is 
the water sector of 1998 when allocation to agriculture from the National Project was 700 
MCM and there was no desalination of seawater. The differential cost may have several 
origins: reduction of the size of basic agriculture (from 700 MCM/Y) reduces the product 
of the sector, this is taken as cost; cuts in supply to agriculture in emergency is costly; we 
give a monetary value to over-utilization of the reservoirs and to shortage in urban 
supply. An additional component is the cost of seawater desalination. Details follow. 
Basic Agriculture: Since farmers have not used all their water quotas in recent 
years, we accepted the price they paid as the value of marginal product of water at the 
basic quantity (700 MCM/Y). Deducting the variable cost of water transfer and adding a 
sum for social contribution of green agriculture, we arrive at NIS 1 per CM.
3 When 
calculating VMP of lower quantities, we assumed unitary elasticity of demand.  
Emergency cuts in Allocation: In emergency, unexpected cuts will damage 
expensive crops and idle irrigation equipments and other production assets. We took the 
value of NIS 2.20 per CM for unexpected cuts in allocation of water to agriculture. 
Over-utilization: It was assumed that over-utilization of the reservoirs will require 
desalination of part of the water supplied for 15 years. Accordingly, we constructed a 
rising cost function approximated by  where y is cost in NIS per 
CM and x is over-utilization in CM. 
2 2.21 0.00003 yx =+ x
                                                
The Urban Sector: To represent the high cost of shortage in the urban sector we 
took the value of NIS 40 per CM. 
Seawater Desalination: Fixed cost, capital and labor, of desalination is expected 
 
3 NIS is New Israeli Sheqel, approximately $0.25 at the time of the analysis.   7
to be NIS 1.60 per CM. Variable cost, of energy, is taken as NIS 1.20 per CM.  
 
Markov Chains and Policy Choice 
The stochastic model of the water economy is a finite Markov chain.
4 The states are 
defined by the amount of water in the reservoirs in the autumn of every year. The 
transformation from one state to another, from one year to the next, is determined by 
precipitation and water utilization. The states are defined, high=1, intermediate=2, low=3. 
We write now, as an example, two Markov matrices P for two alternative policies for 
basic agriculture of 600 MCM/Y and the corresponding cost vectors C.
5 
 Policy  a: Do not cut allocation to agriculture even if in the fall the reservoir is 
low. 













  =  
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 Policy  b: Do not cut supply to agriculture if the reservoirs are high in the fall, cut 
200 MCM if the reservoirs are in intermediate position or they are or low. 
(2)               C
0 . 900 . 1
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  Moving from equation (1) to (2), one notes the reduction in the probability of 
reaching states 2 and 3, intermediate or low reservoirs. Policy b protects the reservoirs 
relative to a. By policy b, allocation to agriculture will be curtailed, at a cost, when the 
reservoirs are low. However, policy a entails a greater probability of over-utilization of 
                                                 
4 The first to suggest and formulate a Markov chain model of a single cell aquifer in Israel was Levin (Bear 
and Levin, 1966). To our knowledge, his model has never been applied in the water economy. 
5 Given a policy matrix, a cost (expected) is associated with each state.    8
the reservoirs. Consequently, policy a is, in general, more costly than policy b. 
  Policy choice is the choice of a Markov matrix P that minimizes cost. The 
algorithm was dynamic programming (Hadley, 1964). 
 
The Programs 
Programming was done in two stages and 48 combinations. In the first stage we found for 
each combination the cost minimizing policy. In the second stage we looked for the 
combination with the lowest overall cost (Table 1 below). Every combination 
incorporated three alternatives from the following. 
  Desalination plants: no plant, 100 MCM/Y, 200 MCM/Y (3 alternatives). 
  Desalination: continuous, flexible (2 alternatives). 
  Basic agriculture; 0, 100, ..., 700 MCM/Y (8 alternatives). 
Table 1: Total Cost (million NIS, expected present value for 20 years) 
Basic  Agriculture  0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 
Excess  Demand  635 1,905 3,789 6,064 8,729  12,698  16,630  20,022 
Reduction of Ag.  22,938  15,087  10,769  7,236  4,880  2,970  1,400  0 
Markov  2,305 3,497 3,953 4,980 6,015 4,835 2,931 2,634 
Total  25,878 20,489 18,511 18,280 19,624 20,503 20,961 22,656 
 
Table 1 summarizes the analysis. The table reports cost for 8 alternatives of basic 
agriculture; form 0 to 700 MCM/Y. The second row, Excess Demand, is the cost of 
desalination to satisfy the quantities demanded as basic agriculture grows from one 
alternative to the next. The third row, Reduction of Ag., is the opportunity cost of not 
producing in agriculture, relative to the reference size of 700 MCM/Y.  
The fourth row in the table, Markov, is the cost associated with water supply 
under uncertainty. Here the components are the cost of emergency cuts in supply to 
agriculture, over-utilization of the reservoirs, and desalination to reduce variability of   9
supply. The entries in the fourth row were constructed in a two-stage minimization 
process. For each size of basic agriculture, water management policy was chosen in 
dynamic programming for five alternatives of desalination: no desalination, continuous 
desalination, and flexible desalination; in both cases of 100 or 200 MCM/Y. The entry in 
the fourth row is the minimum cost over these five alternatives for each size of basic 
agriculture. The program suggested no desalination for basic agriculture of 0, 600, and 
700 MCM/Y. When basic agriculture is zero, desalination to reduce supply variability is 
not needed, and in a relatively large agriculture, desalination is more expensive than cuts 
in supply during emergency periods. For the other sizes of agriculture, flexible 
desalination was found less costly than continuous desalination. 
The overall minimum in Table 1 is for agriculture of 300 MCM/Y. With 250 
MCM/Y outside of the national project, our program recommends fresh water allocation 
to agriculture of 550 MCM/Y as against 950 MCM/Y that the sector used in 1998. 
 
Remarks 
Space restrictions prevent us from demonstrating the rich set of conclusions and insights 
of the analysis; but two findings, perhaps unexpected, can be pointed out. First, a 
comparison of the relatively small values of the row marked Markov in Table 1 to the 
entries in the other two rows reveals that incorporating uncertainty into the analysis of the 
water economy does not modify significantly the optimal plan. Agriculture is not called 
to act as a buffer for dry spells. Second, by conventional wisdom, desalination plants, 
being capital intensive, should be operated continuously. We found that flexible 
operation is preferred.   10
  It is however important to emphasize that the conclusions of the study are 
determined by the nature of the analysis and by the assumptions adopted. For example, 
we included in the value of the marginal product of water in agriculture NIS 0.50 per CM 
as a contribution of farming to the environment; many would regard this assessment as an 
exaggeration. 
  Flexible desalination raises a political issue and an economic question. The first is 
that once a desalination plant has been constructed, political lobbies will demand that it 
be operated continuously (“it is a waste to let a plant stay idle”). If this (economically 
unsound) demand is accepted, agriculture will expand and allocation will have to be cut 
in emergency periods with all the difficulties experienced in recent times. The economic 
question is about water pricing. The way the programming was done, desalination was 
activated when the variable cost of desalinated water was lower than cuts in supply or 
over-utilization. (Total costs were considered in the decision of whether to construct a 
desalination plant.) If the suggested policy is implemented, farmers will take the 
desalinated water if its price is equal to variable cost, but then payments for water will 
not cover total cost. This is a typical case of pricing in the presence of economies of 
scale, here up to capacity of the plant (Bös, 1994). Extraction levies, reflecting scarcity 
values, have recently been instituted in Israel. The levies may cover the fixed cost of 
desalination, but we shall not elaborate here on this issue. 
  The analysis was conducted as if all decisions are made by the planner and water 
users act mechanically. However, once the chosen policy is to cut allocation to 
agriculture in emergencies, and that policy is made public, farmers will plan their 
operations with this possibility in mind. For example, they may plant, on part of their   11
land, inexpensive crops that are not damaged severely when water is in short supply. 
Another alternative is to institute water markets where farmers in need purchase 
allotments from others. These adjustments may lower the cost of emergency cuts in 
supply and may also alter some of the conclusions of our analysis. 
 
Rules vs. Discretion 
When management was by discretion, the Water Commissioner was constantly subject to 
political pressure to expand supply to agriculture; and indeed, quotas were increased 
despite professional advice. The ensuing over-utilization resulted in an ever-growing 
deficit in the reservoirs and a succession of dry years threw the water sector into an acute 
crisis. When the severity of the situation was realized, the Commissioner tried to curtail 
supply to agriculture but his efforts were frustrated when the farmers and their political 
lobby succeeded in dragging the authorities into extended discussions of procedure and 
compensation. 
  We envisage management by rules to be implemented along the following general 
lines: The government will be presented with a program for the water sector. The 
program will be made of three parts. The core of the program will be a set of 
management rules and associated costs. The rules and the costs will be programmed in a 
model similar to the one presented here. Needless to say, if implemented, the model will 
be more detailed and its assumptions rechecked. The second part of the program will 
consist of special rules; such as, development plans, prices, or quotas for emergency 
situation in dry years. The third part of the program will detail the programming methods 
and the assumptions.   12
  The program will be transparent and subject to public debate. In due course the 
government will select a policy, a set of rules to adopt. The government, guided by 
general welfare considerations, need not choose the cost minimizing set. The Water 
Commissioner and the public, particularly the farmers, will know the rules in advance 
and what to expect in rainy or dry years. There will be no need for political bickering 
when an emergency situation materializes. A water authority will monitor the sector and 
the implementation of the rules adopted. The Commissioner will be judged by his 
adherence to the selected policy and the specified goals. 
  We should be realistic; the best plan can be watered down in the political arena. It 
should in fact be expected to be watered down: farmers and others, including in some 
cases the Commissioner himself, will rather have a more flexible policy regime, believing 
that they may squeeze preferential treatment if the rules are not cut and clear. A realistic 
outcome will always be a compromise. The question is whether a compromise is worth 
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